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LTD., a Limited Partnership, 
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Case No. 930522-CA 
Priority 
R1MEF OF APPELIJ 41 P 
PARTIES 
The parties are William "III I'll IIIIM-.L, 
plaintiff/appellant (hereinafter "Lesson") and WestOne bank i»f 
i n iiiiiin nil i r mi I iii mi in ' Mini in [ IIIII 1 11 i | h e r e i n a f t e r " B a n k " ) . 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICT ION 
Jurisdiction I s conferred on, th i s cou it: I: | H I II Iihminim I il IIII I  I I , 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Utah Code Ann MM'I ion frt-/-
STATEMENT 01' ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
] ~ ' 1 d i s t r i c t court rule correctly i.hat I tic1 Hi IIIIIII 
security interest mi superior to the Lessor H lien security 
interest, even i in i • • 111 m i n i i M HI N I • p i i in IIIIIII i L m e a n d 
timely preserved?1 
Because the trial court's ruling on this issue is strictly a 
legal conclusion, this court should accord it no deference, and 
should apply a "correction of error" standard of review.2 Creer 
v. Valley Bank & Trust Co., 770 P.2d 113 (Utah 1988); Scharf v. BMG 
Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
STATUTE 
Lessor's Liens. 
38-3-1. Lien for rent due. 
Except as hereinafter provided, Lessors shall have a lien for rent 
due upon all nonexempt property of the lessee brought or kept upon 
the leased premises so long as the lessee shall occupy said 
premises and for 30 days thereafter. 
38-3-2. Priority of lessor's lien. 
The lien provided for in this chapter shall be preferred to all 
other liens or claims except claims for taxes and liens of 
mechanics under Chapter 1 of this title, perfected security 
interests, and claims of employees for wages which are preferred by 
law; provided, that when a lessee shall be adjudicated a bankrupt, 
or shall make an assignment for the benefit of creditors, or when 
his property shall be put into the possession of a receiver, the 
lien herein provided for shall be limited to the rent for ninety 
days prior thereto. 
Under S 38-3-2, U.C.A., 1990. 
Standards of Review. 
(a) Trial court's interpretation of statute presents question of law reviewed on appeal for correctness. 
Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757 (Utah 1990). 
(b) The appellate court accords the trial court's conclusions of law no particular deference, but 
reviews them for correctness. When the trial court makes findings of fact based on the parties' stipulated 
facts, the appellate court treats these findings as conclusions of law. Zions First Nat'l Bank v. National Am. 
Title Ins., 749 P.2d 651, 656 (Utah 1988). 
(c) When reviewing an appeal from a summary judgment, the appellate court inquires whether there is any 
genuine issue as to any material fact, and if there is not, whether the moving party is entitled to summary 
judgment as a matter of law. The appellate court will liberally construe the evidence in favor of the party 
opposing the motion for summary judgment. Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power k Water, Inc., 798 
P.2d 24 (Utah 1990); Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187, 1188 (Utah 1989). 
2 
J»"J'" J. Attachment in aid of lien. 
Whenever any rent shall be due and unpaid under a lease, or the 
lessee shall be about to remove his property from the leased 
premises, the lessor may have the personal property of the lessee 
which is upon the leased premises and subject to such lien attached 
without other ground for such attachment. 
38-3-4. Attachment—Affidavit and bond. 
The lessor shall before the issue of such writ of attachment file 
a complaint, and an affidavit duly sworn to setting forth the 
amount of rent due over and above all offsets and counterclaims and 
a brief description of the leased premises, and shall further 
state, under oath that such writ of attachment is not sued out for 
the purpose of vexing or harassing the lessee; and the person 
applying for such writ of attachment shall execute arid file a bond 
as in other cases of attachment. 
38-3-5. When attachment will issue—Determination of priorities. 
Upon the filing of such complaint, affidavit, and h ::n id i t shall be 
the duty of the court wherein the same are filed to issue a writ of 
attachment to the proper officer, commanding him to seize the 
property of the defendant subject to such lien, or so much thereof 
as will satisfy the demand, and to make a determination of the 
priorities of the claims, lien. d security interests I n such 
property. 
38-3-6. Execution of writ of attachment. 
It snail oe the duty of the officer to whom the writ of attachment 
is directed to seize the property of such lessee subject to such 
lien, or as much thereof as shall be necessary to satisfy such debt 
and costs, and to keep the same until the determination of the 
action, unless the property is sooner released by bond, or the 
attachment is discharged. 
38-3-7. Release of attachment—Bond. 
A bond iox the release of the attached property may be given, and 
motion to discharge the attachment may be made, as provided in the 
Code of r,4**i1. Procedure in cases of attachment, 
38-3-8. When chapter not applicable. 
This chapter shall not t>e applicable to a written lease for a ter in 
of years in which, as part of the consideration thereof, the lessee 
or assigns shall erect a building or improvements upon the leased 
premises. 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(a) Nature of the Case 
This appeal concerns the priority of a Lessor's lien security 
interest as against a Bank's subsequently acquired security 
interest in equipment located on the leased premises.3 
(b) Course of Proceedings 
Lessor filed its complaint and amended complaints and obtained 
a writ of attachment on the equipment. All defendants except the 
bank defaulted. The bank answered the complaints claiming its 
security interest was superior to Lessor's lien. The trial court 
disposed of the issue on cross motions for summary judgment ruling 
in favor of the Bank. 
(c) Disposition at Trial Court 
The trial court ruled that the Bank's security interest was 
superior to the Lessor's lien, even though it was perfected after 
the Lessor's lien attached to the collateral. 
FACTS4 
The stipulated facts are that Lessor owns a commercial 
building located in Salt Lake Cityf Utah. On July 2, 1988, the 
lessee leased space from Lessor in which to conduct a business.5 
The lease ran from July 1, 1988 to August 31, 1993. 
The equipment is laminating equipment. The equipment was sold for $150,000 by stipulation of lessor 
and the bank with the liens to attach to the proceeds. 
4 
The facts are stipulated. (R353-355) and (Transcript pages 1 and 5). 
The lease was between plaintiff WFPP Trust, as lessor, and Frederick Paul Ninow, Staci L. Ninow and 
R-West Systems, Inc., a Utah corporation, as lessee. (R-9). 
4 
Prior to the Bank obtaining a security interest, lessee moved 
the equipment onto the leased premises,6 Subsequently, the Bank 
agreed to extend lessee a line of credit. The dates of advances 
under the line of credit are unknown to Lessor; however, financing 
statements preceding the advances were filed. R. 255-95. 
The lessee failed to pay the rent. On January 24, 1990 lessee 
abandoned the leased premises. On February 2, 1990, Lessor filed 
its complaint and on February 22, 1990 obtained a writ of 
attachment on lessee's equipment still located on the leased 
premises• 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. Lessor's lien security interest is superior to the Bank's 
security interest because Lessor's security interest was prior in 
time to Bank's security interest and was preserved in accordance 
with §§ 38-3-1 through 38-3-6. 
2. Under common law "distress," Lessor's liens are superior 
to security interests perfected after the inception of the lease or 
the collateral coming onto the leased premises. 
3. If the Utah Lessor's lien statute does not apply, because 
the lessee agreed to make improvements to the real property as part 
of the consideration for the lease,7 then common law applies and 
the Lessor's lien prevails as first in time. 
This was sometime prior to August 4, 1988. 
38-3-8. When chapter not applicable. 
This chapter shall not be applicable to a written lease for a term of years in which, as part of the 
consideration thereof, the lessee or assigns shall erect a building or improvements upon the leased 
premises. 
5 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. LESSOR'S LIEN SECURITY INTEREST IS SUPERIOR TO 
THE BANK'S SUBSEQUENT SECURITY INTEREST UNDER 
§§ 38-3-1 THROUGH 38-3-8, U.C.A., 1990 AND 
UTAH CASE LAW 
The Utah Supreme Court has given the following guidance in 
Citizens Bank v. Elks Bldq., N.V., 663 P2 56, 58 (Utah 1983): 
U.C.A., 1953, § 38-3-1 creates a limited lessor's 
lien: 
Except as hereinafter provided, lessors shall 
have a lien for rent due upon all nonexempt 
property of the lessee brought or kept upon 
the leased premises so long as the lessee 
shall occupy said premises and for thirty days 
thereafter. 
Thus, by the express terms of the statute, the lessor's 
statutory lien terminates thirty-one days after the 
lessee has quit the premises. Therefore, Elks' statutory 
landlord's lien expired January 16, 1981, and, barring a 
contractual lien, Elks stood as an unsecured creditor 
after that date. This conclusion is consistent with 
prior Utah law. Eason v. Wheelock, 101 Utah 162, 120 
P.2d 319 (1941); In re Stone's Estate, 14 Utah 205, 46 P. 
1101 (1896). 
In In re Stone's Estate, supra, we strictly construed a 
predecessor of § 38-3-1. The former version, which is 
almost identical, read: 
Lessors, except as hereinafter provided, shall 
have a lien for rent due upon all of the 
property of the lessee not exempt from 
execution, as long as the lessee shall occupy 
the leased premises, and for thirty days 
thereafter. 
The lessee in that case died and left $270 rent unpaid. 
Thirty-four days after the lessee's death, the lessor, 
Eccles Lumber Company, brought proceedings to claim the 
benefit of the statutory landlord's lien. This Court 
held that the 34-day delay "brought the action of the 
lessor without the terms of the statute, and [therefore] 
his lien was gone." 14 Utah at 208, 46 P. at 1102. We 
stated: "[A]t the expiration of 30 days from the day on 
which a lessee ceases, for any reason, to occupy such 
premises, the lien ceases to exist, and consequently to 
have any force or effect." Id. at 207, 46 P. at 1102. 
6 
In Eason v. Wheelock, supra, we again construed a 
predecessor of § 38-3-1 with the same 30-day cut-off 
clause. There the holder of a chattel mortgage attempted 
to remove property securing the mortgage from leased 
premises before the 30 days had passed. The lessor 
locked the mortgagor out, and the mortgagor sued for 
conversion. Because the mortgagor's attempt to retrieve 
the property occurred within the 30-day statutory period, 
we upheld the lessor's right to retain possession of the 
lessee's property. We also stated that "[a]ny act after 
that date would be one of withholding the property." 101 
Utah at 165, 120 P.2d at 320 (emphasis added). 
In these types of cases, lessors, to preserve their 
statutory liens, must comply with the terms established 
by U.C.A., 1953, §§ 38-3-3 through 38-3-6, including the 
30-day period. These sections permit the lessor to file 
a complaint against the lessee, request a writ of 
attachment, and execute on the writ. Had Elks done this, 
its statutory lien would have been perfected, and it 
would have been prior to the Bank's security interest. 
Applying Citizens to the facts of this case, the parties have 
stipulated that Lessor preserved its statutory lien and security 
interest by timely complying with Sections 38-3-1 through 38-3-6, 
including filing a complaint against the lessee, requesting and 
obtaining a writ of attachment and executing upon the writ within 
the 30 day period. R. 2-7. The parties have also stipulated that 
the Lessor's lien security interest is prior to the Bank's security 
interest. R. 327. Therefore, Lessor has a statutory lien security 
interest under § 38-3-1 which is prior and superior to the Bank's 
security interest. 
Oral Argument8 
The trial court did not consider the Citizens case as 
evidenced by the oral argument. The following summarizes the trial 
court transcript. 
A copy of the trial court transcript is attached as an addendum. 
7 
(a) Bank's Arguments 
During the oral argument before the trial court, the bank's 
attorney recited the facts.9 
With regards to the law, bank's counsel recited § 38-3-2 to 
the court and argued that the landlord has a prior lien, except as 
to taxes, mechanic liens, perfected security interests, and 
employee wage earnings. His argument is that the statute means 
what it says; perfected security interest has priority over a 
landlord lien no matter when it is perfected. 
He argues that there is no guidance in the cases. He referred 
to Gray v. Kappos. 90 Utah 300, 61 P.2d 613 (1936), in which a 
purchase money security interest was held to be prior to the 
landlord's lien, but stated that the facts are distinguishable.10 
He also stated that four other cases from other jurisdictions held 
the landlord's lien to be superior to a perfected security 
interest, but stated that none of the four jurisdictions have a 
statute like Utah's. Bank's counsel argued that where the priority 
is not set forth in a landlord lien statute, that the court then 
looks back to the common law, and the priority is given to the 
first attaching lien. If there is no statute, the landlord wins if 
his lien first attached. He further argued that if our Utah 
statute does not apply to all perfected security interests, but is 
9 
The lease commenced July 2, 1988. The landlord's lien attaches at the start of the tenancy. The 
perfected security interest dates from August 4, 1988. The equipment was brought on the premises prior to 
August 4, 1988. The lease is in default, and the lessee owes the lessor $95,000. The bank loan is in default 
in the amount of $150,000. The collateral was sold by stipulation for $150,000 and the competing liens attached 
to the proceeds. 
1 0
 In Gray v. Kappos, 61 P2 613 (Utah 1936), the court states at page 615: 
"The lien of plaintiff attached as soon as the sheep were brought upon the 
leased premises . . •." 
8 
limited to prior perfected security interests, then there is no 
need for the statute, i.e. we would be where we were under common 
law. 
Bank's counsel also argued that there was a good policy reason 
for the Utah Legislature changing from the common law priorities to 
making all perfected security interests superior to landlords 
liens. He argued that the Legislative policy reason was to allow 
lessees to borrow money and to allow banks to take security 
interests without worrying about landlord liens.11 
The bank also argued that for the term "perfected security 
interest" not to have priority over a landlord lien unless it was 
created prior to the landlord's lien, the same principle, i.e. 
priority of creation, should be applied to all the other statutory 
exceptions, i.e. tax liens, employee wage claims, and mechanic 
liens.12 
(b) Lessor's Arguments 
Lessor's legal counsel in its presentation to the trial court 
agreed on the facts and the issue and stated that the Utah statute 
codifies the common law. Lessor's counsel referred to Gray v. 
Kappos. which involved § 52-3-2 Revised Statutes, 1933, as amended, 
where the landlord lien was preferred to all other liens except 
The reason for the statute being changed by the Utah Legislature is contained in Senate Bill 191, 
which was to make corrections to the Utah Uniform Commercial Code. In 1977, the phrase "mortgages for purchase 
money" was deleted, and the phrase "perfected security interest" was implemented in its place. The Uniform 
Commercial Code introduced the wording "security interest" to replace all other types of liens, such as chattel 
mortgages, hypothecations, pledges, conditional sales, and the like. Thus, the statutory change appears to have 
been made for these purposes rather than as a thoughtful analysis as to policy and priorities between competing 
interests such as banks and landlords. 
It should be noted that banks commonly use landlord subordination agreements before making loans 
to known lessees. The bank could have avoided the risk of the landlord having a superior lien by using a 
landlord subordination agreement. Originally, the bank pleaded as an affirmative defense a landlord 
subordination agreement, but apparently there was no such subordination in this case. (R-116) 
9 
claims for taxesr mechanic's liens, mortgages for purchase money. 
and employee claims for wages. The only statutory change in the 
present statute § 38-3-2 is that mortgages for purchase money has 
been eliminated and perfected security interest inserted in its 
place. 
The facts of the Kappos case are that the bank loaned Kappos 
$2,000 in October of 1928 to purchase sheep. The bank took a note 
and mortgage. In January, 1929, a grazing lease was entered into 
and the real property was used for grazing sheep for several years. 
The note went into default and was renewed with additional monies 
being advanced. The first mortgage was never released; it was a 
renewal, not a new transaction. The sheep were sold in 1932, and 
the landlord sought to satisfy its rent from the sale of the sheep. 
The bank's lien came into being before the inception of the lease 
and before the sheep were placed on the premises. The landlord 
claimed priority over the bank's advances made after the lease 
inception and after the sheep entering the premises. The bank's 
mortgage was not recorded but was valid against those with actual 
notice. The landlord acquired no rights greater than the lessee's. 
The landlord's lien attached to what the lessee had, and the 
lessee's rights were subject to the purchase money mortgage; 
therefore, the landlord's lien was also subject to a prior purchase 
money mortgage. 
Mr. Orton, lessor's counsel, argued that the first event in 
this case was the lease commencing July 1, 1988; secondly, the 
equipment coming onto the premises; and thirdly the bank obtaining 
10 
a perfected security interest. In the Kappos case, the first event 
was the creation of the chattel mortgage; the second event was the 
inception of the lease; the third event was the sheep coming on the 
premises; and the fourth event was the subsequent renewal note. Mr. 
Orton argued that the Legislature intended prior perfected security 
interests to prevail, but that if subsequent perfected security 
interests prevail over prior landlord liens, that the landlord 
could be deprived of his lien through "sham transactions." A lessee 
could borrow money, give a perfected security interest, and defeat 
a landlord lien. The trial court, Judge Stirba, asked Mr. Orton if 
there were not remedies for that type of conduct under the Uniform 
Commercial Code. Mr. Orton responded that fraud remedies are 
available, but that the rule from the Kappos case is that the first 
in time prevails. If the lease is first in time, the equipment 
then comes onto the premises, and a security interest is 
subsequently perfected, the landlord should prevail. 
(c) Trial Court's Decision 
Following the oral presentations of counsel, trial judge 
Stirba stated that she had reviewed the pleadings and the cases, 
particularly the Utah cases, and the prior and present statutes. 
She stated that the present statute is susceptible to both 
interpretations advanced by the respective legal counsel. She 
stated it was not abundantly clear what the Legislature intended, 
and that the Legislature did not specify that security interests 
had to be perfected prior to the equipment coming onto the 
property. She stated that she had considered the statute and the 
11 
exceptions to the landlord priority. She noted that the exceptions 
for taxes, mechanic liens, and employee wages do not require that 
they be established prior to the collateral coming onto the leased 
premises. She also noted that the statute says the lessor's lien 
is preferred to all of the liens or claims except for " • . . 
perfected security interests." She stated the Legislature has not 
required that perfected security interests be perfected prior to 
the property being brought onto the leasehold, and that because the 
other lien exceptions do not have to be created prior to the 
landlord lien to prevail, that a perfected security interest need 
not be created prior to the landlord lien for it to prevail. She 
noted this is a case of first impression, and that sham may occur. 
Her legal conclusion was that the statutory language does not 
indicate that the Legislature intended the security interest to be 
perfected prior to the collateral coming onto the property to 
prevail. Therefore, the trial court granted WestOne Bank's motion 
for summary judgment. She did not consider the Citizens case. 
Furthermore, she did not treat the Lessor's lien as a perfected 
security interest. Had she done so, she would have reached the 
correct, opposite conclusion i.e. that the Lessor's lien as a 
prior, preserved security interest prevails over the subsequent 
Bank security interest. 
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POINT II. THE LESSOR'S LIEN SECURITY INTEREST IS 
SUPERIOR TO THE BANK'S SUBSEQUENT SECURITY 
INTEREST UNDER COMMON LAW DISTRESS. 
Common Law Distress13 
Distress for rent in arrears, whereby the landlord may seize 
personal property on the demised premises, is one of the oldest, as 
well as one of the most efficient, of the common law remedies for 
the collection of rent. Re West Side Paper Co., 162 F. 110 (3d 
Cir. 1908). The remedy had its origin in the feudal tenures and 
appears to have arisen when the common law process of gavelet and 
cessavit, by which the landlord could seize the land itself for 
rent in arrears and hold it until payment was made, fell in disuse. 
When these remedies fell into disuse, distresses appeared to have 
arisen whereby instead of seizing the land, the landlord seized all 
movables on the land and held them until he received payment. 
Henderson v. Maver, 225 U.S. 631 (1912). The right to distrain 
arises from the moment the relation of landlord and tenant is 
established, and as administered at common law, the remedy is 
enforceable against any removable property found upon the demised 
premises, whether belonging to the tenant or to a stranger. 
Statutory Liens 
Statutes giving the landlord a lien for rent on the property 
of his tenant are considered to be the outgrowth of the common law 
right of distress, and the principles controlling in cases of 
distress are often resorted to in determining the rights of the 
parties under such statutes. Wolcott v. Ashenfelter, 5 N.M. 442, 
1 3
 See 49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant, Landlord's Lien, from which the following is summarized. 
13 
23 P. 780 (1890). The statutory lien of the landlord for rent 
attaches at the beginning of the tenancy, or when the chattels are 
brought upon the premises. Such a lien does not depend upon a 
levy, and exists independently of the institution of any proceeding 
for its enforcement. The remedy by levy, distress, or attachment, 
is simply to enforce a lien already existing. Gila Water Co. v. 
Int'l Finance Corp., 13 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1926). The landlord's 
statutory lien must be enforced by judicial proceedings. Provision 
is made in some statutes for enforcing the lien by attachment. In 
some jurisdictions, the landlord is required to enforce his lien 
within a specified time; otherwise, it is lost. 
Priorities 
A landlord's lien for the payment of rent is superior to any 
judgment or other lien acquired subsequently to the creation of the 
tenancy or the bringing of property onto the rented premises. 
Howard v. Calhoun. 155 Fla. 689, 21 So. 2d 361 (1945). 
Generally, a landlord's lien created by statute has been held 
to be superior to a chattel mortgage given by the tenant after he 
has rented or entered into possession of the premises. Beall v. 
White, 94 U.S. 382 (1877). 
Therefore, the only way the Bank's security interest should 
prevail is (1) if it were perfected prior to the lessor's lien, or 
(2) perfected after the lessor's lien expired. That did not happen 
in this matter; therefore, the lessor's lien security interst 
should prevail. 
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POINT III. IF THE UTAH LESSOR'S LIEN STATUTE DOES 
NOT APPLY, THEN COMMON LAW APPLIES AND 
THE LESSOR'S LIEN PREVAILS AS THE FIRST 
TO ATTACH. 
Utah s tatutory l e s s o r ' s l i e n s are provided for in Chapter 3 , 
Sect ions 38-3-1 through 38-3-8 of U.C.A., 1990. When Chapter 3 i s 
not appl i cab le , common law p r i n c i p l e s apply.14 
Section 38-3-8 provides that "this chapter s h a l l not be 
appl icable t o a wri t ten l e a s e for a term of years in which, as part 
of the considerat ion thereof , the l e s s e e or ass igns s h a l l e rec t a 
bui ld ing or improvements upon the leased premises." This i s 
exac t ly our fac t s i t u a t i o n . The l ease was entered in to July 2 , 
1988, and the term was for a period of f i v e years and two months, 
beginning the f i r s t day of July 1988, and ending the 31st day of 
August, 1993. Lease A r t i c l e XVIII provides for , "additional 
condit ions ." 1 5 The subject l e a s e i s for a term of years with part 
of the considerat ion c o n s i s t i n g of the l e s s e e erec t ing improvements 
upon the leased premises; therefore , Chapter 3 i s not appl icable t o 
t h i s l e a s e . Under the common law, the l e s s e e ' s l i e n at taches t o 
the property f i r s t and the landlord's l i e n has p r i o r i t y over the 
subsequent l i e n of the bank. 
Mr. Carney stated during his oral argument: "There are also cited in the other side's brief four 
cases from other jurisdictions. They do hold that the landlord's lien is superior to the perfected security 
interest. However, in each one of those cases, and in none of those cases, did the state involved have a 
statute like ours that says, 'perfected security interest shall be prior to the landlord's lien.' All of those 
cases, it was silent on the subject, and simply said that the landlord would have a lien. In which case, the 
court goes back to the common law, which is first to attach liens. And if we didn't have this statute, I would 
suspect that is what you would hear. The landlord would win, the first to attach." 
Lessor and lessee agree that lessee shall accept the building 'as is' condition and further 
agree as follows: (1) Lessor shall furnish and install concrete floor to match existing in front of area of 
warehouse, approximately 30' x 110'; (2) lessor shall furnish and install commercial grade carpet and base in 
existing office area; (3) lessor and lessee each agree to pay one-half the cost to enlarge one existing roll-up 
door to 14' x 14'. Final appearance shall match existing. 
15 
CONCLUSION 
The Lessor's lien security interest is superior to the Bank's 
subsequent security interest and Lessor/ therefore, respectfully 
requests this court to direct the trial court to enter judgment 
accordingly. 
DATED t h i s l$TUr day of Octoberf 1993• 
&+~ * * ~ 
Robert F. Oi 
Milo S. Mar{ 
MARSDEN, ORTOff, CAHOON & GOTTFREDSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
3 1 ipjjg COURT: Let's go on the record in the matter 
4 of William F. Webb against Ninow, case No. 900900672. Appearing 
5 on behalf of the plaintiff is Mr. Robert Orton. Appearing on 
behalf of defendant West One Bank is Francis Carney. 
The matter comes before the Court on West One Bank's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and the Plaintiffs Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. I reviewed the pleadings in the case 
and I appreciate Mr. Carney's book here just summarizing the 
pleadings and setting forth all of the courtesy copies of the 
pleadings which are at issue, and I have reviewed those. 
Mr. Carney, you may proceed. 
MR. CARNEY: Thank you. Your Honor. Let me briefly 
highlight the facts and if I am telling you facts you already 
know, please interrupt me. 
THE COURT: I guess the facts are not in dispute. 
You folks are in agreement as to when these things all occurred. 
It is just as I see it: the legal question of whether that is 
a timing element in this. 
MR. CARNEY: Yeah, and in that regard the timing 
element is that the lease is July 2nd of '88 and I think the 
cases do hold that the landlord's lien attaches as of the start 
of the tenancy. That would be July 2nd of '88. 
And then we have the first in a series of perfected 
1 security interest, all of which now are the bank loans starting 
2
 August 4, 1988. And we have the equipment brought onto the 
3 premises sometime before the fourth of August, 1988. We have 
4
 a default in the lease. The landlord is owed about $95,000. 
5
 The bank is in default on the bank loans, owed about $150,000. 
6
 The Court may not be aware of this, but the 
7
 collateral has been taken off the premises by stipulation of 
8 everyone. We happened to find a buyer who took the collateral 
9
 I and sold it and got the $150,000 for the collateral, and that 
is sitting now in a bank account gathering interest, by 
H stipulation of everyone. We have agreed that we would still 
1 2
 J treat the priority issues as if the equipment were still on the 
premises. 
14
 I The Statute is 38-3-2, the landlord's lien statute. 
15 J it says landlords have prior liens, have a lien which is prior 
to everybody except taxes, mechanic's liens, perfected security 
10 
16 
17
 j interest and employee's wage earnings. Our position simply is 
18 I that this statute means what it says. We have a perfected 
19 | security interest, therefore we are prior to the landlord's lien] 
2 0
 I Now, as 1 understand Mr, Orton's position is that 
21 I the statute doesn't mean all perfected interest. It means only 
22 J perfected security interest which were perfected prior to the 
23 I time the equipment came on or the collateral came onto the 
24 property. In other words, if you had lease, first event; 
25 J second event, collateral comes onto the property. Third event. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
bank takes a lien, perfected security interest rather, that type 
of security interest would not be prior since it arose after 
the date the collateral was on the premises. That is the issue: 
"Is that so was not so?" 
I find no guidance one way or the other in the cases. 
There is an old 1936 case referred to by Mr. Orton called 
Grey vs. Cappos, involving some sheep. The court held that the 
purchase money security interest was prior to the landlord's 
lien. But I don't think the facts are quite similar to this 
case, and the court doesn't really give us any guidance. 
There are also cited in the other side's brief four 
cases from other jurisdictions. The do hold that the landlord's 
lien is superior to the perfected security interest. However, 
in each one of those cases, and in none of those cases, did 
the state involved have a statute like ours that says "perfected 
security interest shall be prior to the landlord's lien." 
All of those cases, it was silent on the subject and simply said 
that the landlord would have a lien. In which case, the court 
goes back to the common law which is first to attach liens. And 
if we didn't have this statute, I would suspect that is what you 
would to hear. The landlord would win, the first to attach. 
If we were to interpret the statute to mean not 
perfected security interest, but prior perfected security 
interest, I suspect there would be no reason to have this statute 
[That would bring us back to where we were under the common law; 
1 first to attach liens. I suggest that this is a change, perhaps 
2 for a good policy reason. A change from the common law to allow 
3 all perfected security interest to be superior to landlords• 
4 liens. Perhaps the reason was that to allow people who lease 
5 premises to go out and borrow money and allow the banks to 
6 take security interest and equipment which is on the premises 
7 without worrying about the landlord. 
8 The other side says "Well, in this case, the landlord 
9 I could be defrauded by sham security interest." I guess that is 
10 so, but I guess there is a way to look beyond sham security 
11 I interest. I also suppose that the landlord could take his own 
12 J UCC-1 to cover future rents ahead. I hadn't really thought 
13 that through, but it seems to me that if the landlord was that 
1** concerned about the equipment, he could do that and then you wouljcl 
15 simply have a contest under UCC-9: first to file will win. 
16 Basically, though, what 1 am arguing, if the 
17 I legislature wanted to say "Prior perfected security interest 
18 only," it would have said so, and it didn't. It says "perfected 
19 security interest." We think the statute should be interpreted 
20 according to what it says. 
21 THE COURT: Are you aware of any other cases, or any 
22 case dealing with any of the other provisions in Section 38-3-2 
23 J that contrue it one way or the other, whether they have to be 
24 established prior to the equipment being brought up to the 
25 property or — 
1 \ MR. CARNEY: 1 have found nothing. 
2 THE COURT: Or similar arrangement? 
3 I MR. CARNEY: I have found absolutely nothing on this. 
4 It says "perfected security interest." I think that was a 
5 1977 amendment. Before that, I think it said "purchase money 
6 security interest." It goes back to 1898 and there is only 
7 that '36 case and there is a Ml case which I think is also 
3 referenced. 
9 THE COURT: The Eastman case? 
10 MR* CARNEY: Yes, and I don't think that gives us 
H much guidance either way. 
12 One other thing, I think if we adopted Mr. Orton's 
13 position to be logical it would seem to me that would also have 
14 I to apply to tax liens and to employee wage claims, and to 
15 mechanics1 liens. So, for example, for tax liens they would 
16 not have any priority unless they arose prior to the time the 
17 lienable collateral was brought onto the premises. 
18 THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Orton. 
19 MR. ORTON: It appears we are in total agreement on 
20 the facts. Your Honor, and what the issue is. I believe that 
2i really the statute codifies what the common law is and I would 
22 like to spend just a little bit of time talking about the Grey 
23 I vs. Cappos case. The statute which was in effect at the time 
24 of that case was 52-3-2, revised statutes of 1933. And that 
25 statute provided "that the lien provided for in this chapter 
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shall be preferred to all other liens or claims, except claims 
for taxes and liens of mechanics under Chapter 1 of this title, 
mortgages for purchase money, and claims of employees for wages 
which are preferred by law." 
The current statute which was in effect at the time 
this cause of action arose only makes one difference, and that 
difference is instead of saying "mortgages for purchase money," 
it says "perfected security interest." So really I don't see 
a lot of change in the two statutes. We are dealing now under 
the UCC where security interests are required to be perfected 
generally by UCC-1 filing. So with that in mind, I think that 
although the Grey vs. Cappos case doesn't come right down and 
say it in so many words, it is helpful and let me just review 
the facts of that case if I might briefly. 
In October of 1982 the bank loaned Cappos $2,000 to 
purchase sheep and Cappos gave the bank a note and a mortgage to 
security payment of the purchase price. Subsequently, in 
January of 1929, the grazing lease was entered into. And then 
for several years thereafter, sheep were grazed on the landlord's] 
property during the summer months of each year. After that 
grazing lease was entered into, there was a default or non-paymentt 
of the note and mortgage, and the note and mortgage were renewed.! 
And then on at least two subsequent occasions, there was additional 
money advanced and the note and mortgage were renewed. There was] 
never a release given of the first mortgage and the Court found 
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that the intension of the mortgagor and mortgagee was that the 
new transactions constituted a renewal, not a new transaction. 
And that is the way the case went off, as I see it. The sheep 
were then sold in 1932, while on the premises of the landlord, 
and the landlord brings suit to collect rentals due and owing 
and seeks to have the sheep sold and collect the rent from the 
sale of the sheep. 
Now, as I understand what the court is saying in that 
case is. No. 1, the parties intended each new transaction or 
each new note and mortgage as a renewal of the first note and 
mortgage. And the earlier ones were not satisfied but there was 
simply a renewal. The court says that legal effect should be 
given to the intent of the mortgagor and the mortgagee. 
Further, the plaintiff does not claim that his lien 
has priority over the first lien that was given, which came 
before the lease and before the sheep were ever put on the 
premises. And, however, on the later advances of money, he 
does claim that his lessor's lien is superior. The court says 
that the mortgage, though unrecorded, is valid as between the 
mortgagor and the mortgagee and those with notice of the 
mortgage. 
And finally, the court says that the plaintiff acquired 
no rights which Cappos, the owner of the sheep, did not have. 
The lien attached to whatever rights Cappos did have. And since 
that right is subject to the purchase money mortgage, it must 
1 follow that the lien of the plaintiff is also subject to it. 
2
 I I think that language is very helpful. 
3 Our case is different. What we have here is, we 
4 have a lease on July lf 1988. followed by equipment coming onto 
5 the premises. And then subsequent to the lease and the equipment 
6 coming onto the premises, there is a perfected security interest, 
7 And that is where the difference comes in between our case and 
8 the Cappos case; and that is that in our case the lease is 
9 entered into and the equipment comes onto the premises before 
10 any security interest. And as I view what the court is saying, 
11 the reason the court is holding against the plaintiff lessor in 
12 this case is because it contrues the subsequent notes and 
13 I mortgages as renewals of the earlier mortgage which did come 
14 before the lease and before the sheep were put on the premises. 
15 Now, I really think that if that were not the 
16 I construction that the legislature intended to be given, that 
17 certainly the lessor could be deprived of his lien rights though 
lb a sham transaction. A lessee presumably within a day or week 
19 before the termination of the lease, seeing the lease coming 
20 to an end and realizing he owes money on the lease, could borrow 
21 money, give security against the property on the premises and 
22 claim under the statute that the perfected security interest 
23 given is superior to the lien of the lessor. 
24 THE COURT: Let's suppose the legislature did intend 
25 I that the statute not require perfection prior to the equipment. 
8 
1 I property coming onto the leasehold. Assume that for a moment. 
2 And someone did try to defraud someone by perfecting a security 
3 interest in order to avoid the responsibilities of paying the 
4 leasehold and having a lien attached, would you see no remedy 
5 whatsoever in the Uniform Commercial Code for that kind of 
6 conduct? 
7 I MR. ORTON: There might be a remedy based on fraud 
8 or something of that nature, yes. Yes. I really find no law, 
9 Your Honor, which would support the defendant's position in 
10 this case. And the law, we cited in our brief, I think, is 
11 consistent with our position. Although the facts are somewhat 
12 different and the statutes are somewhat different, I think if 
13 you take everything we have cited and what I understand the 
14 general law to be across the country, and then look at the one 
15 Utah case we do have, and view the basis on which the Supreme 
16 Court came down the way it did on this case, I think the logical 
17 I conclusion is that the lessor's lien in this case where the 
18 lease was entered into first, the equipment came onto the 
19 premises second, and then the security interest came after, 
20 that the lessor's lien has priority. 
21 THE COURT: All right, thank you. 
22 MR. ORTON: Thank you. 
23 THE COURT: Mr. Carney. 
24 I MR. CARNEY: A small point. Your Honor. 9 — I can't 
25 remember what it is — 9104 says that in order to create a 
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security interest, you must give value and if no true value is 
given, then there is no security interest and a sham could be 
taken apart like that. I will submit it, unless there are 
questions I haven't answered. 
THE COURT: No, thank you. I have reviewed the 
pleadings as I indicated previously, and the cases that you have 
cited, particularly the Utah cases. Mr. Orton. I think — and 
I have looked at this statute and predecessor statute as well. 
And I think that the statute may be suspectible to both 
interpretations. 1 don't think that this is abundantly clear 
what the legislature intended with regard to that. At least, 
it don't specifically address whether the security interest had 
to be perfected prior to the property equipment being brought 
onto the premises. I have considered the statute and the other 
interests that are accepted under it; specifically, the claims 
for taxes and liens of mechanics under Chapter 1 of this title, 
and claims of employees for wages which are preferred by law, 
none of which, I believe, are required to be perfected prior 
to the leasehold creations, if you will, and the interest coming 
onto the property, if you will, under the leasehold. And the 
statute does say "that the lien provided for in this chapter 
shall be preferred to all of the liens or claims except for, 
among the other things, perfected security interest." 
After considering all of it and your arguments, as 
well, I am persuaded that the legislature has not required that 
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the claimed security interest be perfected prior to the property 
being brought onto the leasehold. And I think that because — 
I don't see that the other interest there have to be perfected 
either. And the legislature hasn't seen fit to distinguish 
perfected security interest from other interest that it accepted 
under that particular statute. 
This does seem to be a case of first impression, 
at least so far as the perfected security interest language is 
concerned. And because it is my view that — concern about 
sham security interest may occur, I think there is some 
safeguard for that. Accordingly, I think that the language of 
the statute, although not as clear as every one would like it 
to be, the plain reading of the statute does not indicate that 
the legislature intended security interest to be perfected 
prior to the property being secured from coming onto the 
leasehold, and that would be my ruling, Mr. Carney, Mr. Orton. 
Therefore, I am granting West One Bank's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. I am denying the plaintiff's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. 
Mr. Carney, I would like you to prepare Findings of 
fact. Conclusions of Law, and Judgment in accordance with the 
Court's ruling. 
MR. CARNEY: Thank you. Your Honor. 
* * * * * * * 
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